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Abstract 
Working-age people with disabilities are much more likely than people without 
disabilities to live in poverty and not be employed or have shared in the economic 
prosperity of the late 1990s. Today’s disability policies, which remain rooted in 
paternalism, create a “poverty trap” that recent reforms have not resolved. This 
discouraging situation will continue unless broad, systemic reforms promoting economic 
self-sufficiency are implemented, in line with more modern thinking about disability. 
Indeed, the implementation of such reforms may be the only way to protect people with 
disabilities from the probable loss of benefits if the federal government cuts funding for 
entitlement programs. This article suggests some principles to guide reforms and 
encourage debate and asks whether such comprehensive reforms can be successfully 
designed and implemented.   
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Working-age Americans with disabilities are much more likely to live in poverty than 
other Americans are, and most did not share in the economic prosperity of the late 1990s. 
At the same time, public expenditures to support working-age Americans with disabilities 
are growing at a rate that will be difficult to sustain when the baby boom generation 
retires and begins to draw Social Security Retirement and Medicare benefits. We suggest 
that better policies would both improve the lives of many people with disabilities and 
stimulate the labor supply of working-age people with disabilities at a time when labor is 
becoming an increasingly scarce resource. Accordingly, the current policies that trap 
people with disabilities in poverty and encourage them to retire early even when they still 
may have some work capacity should be replaced with policies that reflect twenty-first-
century realities.  
 
More specifically, we argue that some current policies are outdated and paternalistic and 
should be replaced by policies promoting economic self-sufficiency and bringing the 
relevant programs in line with more modern thinking about disability. Indeed, today’s 
paternalistic policies trap many people with disabilities in poverty by devaluing their 
often considerable ability to contribute to their own support through work. Although 
recent reforms are an improvement, they do not adequately promote true economic self-
sufficiency. Rather, they should take advantage of the productive capacities of people 
with disabilities while at the same time providing sufficient support to ensure that those 
who are working will achieve a higher standard of living than they can under the current 
policies. Such policies would   
 
• Take advantage of the advances in medicine, technology, training, and workplace 
modifications that enable many people with significant physical or mental impairments to 
work.  
• Be consistent with changes in the social expectations for people with disabilities and for 
the workplace improvements embodied in the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).  
• Increase public support for disability programs and reduce the vulnerability of people 
with disabilities to future program cuts.  
• Motivate and empower people with disabilities to participate more fully in the economic 
mainstream.  
• Address unrealistically low societal expectations about the work capacity of people with 
disabilities.  
 
The transition to economic self-sufficiency policy has already begun, with several 
important pieces of legislation and other initiatives that reflect a more modern approach 
to disability policy. We argue, however, that these changes alone are inadequate to 
achieve the ambitious objectives of advocates and policymakers. More radical change is 
needed, and many difficult challenges remain to be addressed. Leaders in business and 
government must recognize that this is an urgent issue for the country’s entire economy, 
not just an issue of providing more appropriate support  
for people with disabilities.  
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Table 1. Employment and Poverty Rates by Disability Status, 2003  
 
Disability Employment Rate Poverty Rate 
Sensory Disability  47.8% 20.5% 
Physical Disability 32.2% 24.4% 
Mental Disability  28.2% 30.1% 
Self-Care Disability 17.6% 28.3% 
Go-Outside-Home Disability 17.4% 29.1% 
Employment Disability 18.1% 28.9% 
Any Disability  37.9% 23.3% 
No Disability 77.6% 8.9% 
 
Source: R. Weathers, A User Guide to Disability Statistics from the American Community 
Survey (Ithaca, N.Y.: Rehabilitation Research and Training Center for Disability and 
Demographic Statistics, Cornell University, 2004).  
 
Employment and Poverty of People with Disabilities: A Discouraging Picture  
 
The employment rate of working-age people with disabilities is well below that of their 
nondisabled cohort, regardless of what national survey is used or how disability is 
measured. The American Community Survey (ACS) is a survey by the U.S. Census 
Bureau designed to replace the decennial census long form. Starting in 2000, the ACS has 
contained six measures of disability: sensory, physical, mental, self care, ability to go 
outside the home, and employment. Based on these measures, 38 percent of working-age 
people with at least one of the ACS disabilities were employed in 2003, compared with 
78 percent of people reporting none of the ACS disabilities (last row, second coumn of 
Table 1). The low employment rates of people with disabilities are reflected in their 
poverty rates, which for people with at least one disability are more than twice as high as 
for those with no disabilities (second to last row, last column of Table 1). Many others 
live in families with incomes just above the official federal poverty standard, which does 
not allow for the extraordinary disability-related expenses incurred by many people with 
disabilities.  
 
These poverty rates are high, even though almost 9 million working-age adults with 
disabilities receive income support from the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. Although the SSI and SSDI programs 
have provided cash assistance to millions of Americans since their inception, these 
benefits often are not enough to lift incomes above the poverty standard. Indeed, the 
maximum federal SSI benefit now is only about 75 percent of the federal poverty 
standard for an individual. In addition, many people with disabilities do not receive 
support from these programs. In 2002, 41.6 percent of working-age adults with any ACS 
disability who lived in a household with an income below the poverty line received 
income support from SSDI and/or SSI. Another 6.8 percent lived in a household whose 
income was from the federal/state Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
program (Weathers 2004). In many areas, the basic SSI monthly benefit is not sufficient 
to pay for housing; for example, in 2002, the average national rent for a modest one-
© 2006, Milbank Memorial Fund. Used with permission.  
 3 
  Stapleton, O’Day, Livermore, Imparato 
  Dismantling the Poverty Trap 
bedroom apartment was 105 percent of the SSI monthly benefit amount (O’Hara and 
Cooper 2003). Although the country’s recent economic growth has somewhat reduced the 
poverty rate of people without disabilities, it has not helped people with disabilities 
(Burkhauser, Daly, and Houtenville 2001; Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Wittenburg 2003; 
Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba 2004; Burkhauser and Stapleton 2003, 2004a). For 
example, the poverty rates that Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba (2004) report for 
working-age adults with “long-term” work limitations (i.e., work limitations reported in 
each of two surveys, twelve months apart) are comparable in magnitude to the ACS 
poverty rate estimates. When comparing the two surveys conducted during the business 
cycle peak in 1989 with the two surveys conducted during the business cycle peak of 
2001, they found that the poverty rate had risen from 26.9 percent in 1989 to 27.6 percent 
in 2000, compared with a decline from 7.1 percent to 6.5 percent for those without work 
limitations.  
 
Unprecedented Growth of Dependence on Public Programs  
 
The decline in the economic status of people with disabilities despite higher public 
expenditures has outpaced economic growth. In FY2002, the federal government spent 
$87.3 billion on SSI and SSDI benefits and another $82.1 billion on Medicare and 
Medicaid programs for working-age people with disabilities. Adding federal expenditures 
for housing, food assistance, rehabilitation, income assistance for families, assistance for 
veterans, and other programs for people with disabilities brings the total federal spending 
to approximately $226 billion: 11.3 percent of total federal outlays in FY2002 and 2.2 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP).  
 
From FY1986 to FY2002, federal disability expenditures grew 85 percent more than total 
federal outlays and 57 percent more than the growth rate of the GDP. In FY2002 the state 
governments contributed an additional $44.6 billion under Medicaid and $2.9 billion for 
state supplements to SSI (Goodman and Stapleton 2005). In sum, expenditures are 
growing faster than federal outlays and GDP because of the rapid growth in the number 
of people with disabilities receiving income and health care support, along with the rising 
cost of health care. Although one reason for the growing number receiving benefits is the 
aging of the baby boom generation, another important reason is the higher participation 
rate for almost every age group.  
 
The single most important component in the growth of federal disability expenditures is 
the greater number of people on the SSDI rolls, all of whom also are enrolled in Medicare 
after a twenty-four-month waiting period. One recent study estimates that the fraction of 
the working-age population on the SSDI rolls rose by 76 percent from 1984 to 2003 
(Duggan and Imberman 2006). Although the authors trace some of this to the aging of the 
baby boom generation and the long-term growth of female labor force participation, they 
attribute the bulk of the growth (82 percent for men and 72 percent for women) to 
program policies and how they interact with the economy. They note a 48 percent rise in 
the number of nonelderly adult DI recipients from December 1995 to December 2004 
versus a 15 percent increase in the number of nonelderly adult SSI recipients. They also 
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point out that growth in the SSDI rolls is likely to accelerate if policies are not changed. 
We will return to this topic later in the article.  
The economic fortunes of people with disabilities are therefore not rising despite the 
rapidly growing expenditures for public programs intended to improve their economic 
well-being. Moreover, without raising taxes or reallocating funding from other federal 
programs, the current rate of expenditure growth cannot be sustained over time (SSA 
Trustees 2005), and the federal government’s current and projected fiscal circumstances 
make any increase in funding extremely problematic. The Congressional Budget Office 
recently concluded that “even if taxation reached levels that were unprecedented in the 
United States, current spending policies could become financially unsustainable”  
(Congressional Budget Office 2005). In fact, the growth of SSDI expenditures is 
increasingly responsible for the overall fiscal crises facing the Social Security program, 
so some cuts in expenditures seem inevitable (Autor and Duggan 2006).  
 
The Beginning of the Transition to Economic Self-Sufficiency Policy  
 
Some thirty years ago, the emergence of the independent living movement planted the 
seeds of economic self-sufficiency policy. This movement first promoted the philosophy 
that people with disabilities should have the same civil rights, options, and control over 
choices in their own lives as people without disabilities have. Today, the idea of people 
with disabilities living, working, and participating in their communities has become the 
expectation and goal of many programs and policies, including the ADA passed in 1990, 
the Rehabilitation Act originally passed in 1973 and updated in 1998, the 1975 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and the 1999 Ticket to Work and Work 
Incentives Improvement Act (Ticket Act), which provides employment and other 
supports that SSI and SSDI beneficiaries need in order to work.  
 
Most recently, the Bush administration developed the New Freedom Initiative, a 
multifaceted effort to remove barriers to community living for people with disabilities 
and long-term illnesses. A number of new programs, demonstrations, and grant 
opportunities for states that have arisen from the Ticket Act and New Freedom Initiative 
offer opportunities to experiment with changes in disability programs and policies and to 
offer a wider range of supports to people with disabilities to help them become 
independent. For instance, the Assets for Independence Act of 1998 encourages low-
income populations to contribute to Individual Development Accounts, but without 
jeopardizing their eligibility for cash benefits like SSI. When coupled with earned income, 
these savings programs can help address the current long-term poverty of many 
Americans with disabilities.  
 
These changes have been accompanied by, and are synchronous with, a change in the 
disability paradigm (i.e., the concept of disability). The old paradigm, sometimes called 
the medical model, posits that disability is purely a biological phenomenon, a physical or 
mental impairment that makes the individual unable to participate in mainstream social 
activities, including work. The medical model now has been replaced by a 
social/environmental model (Nagi 1965; World Health Organization 2001), which 
recognizes the role of social and physical environments in the life experiences of people 
© 2006, Milbank Memorial Fund. Used with permission.  
 5 
  Stapleton, O’Day, Livermore, Imparato 
  Dismantling the Poverty Trap 
with disabilities. Each of the congressional initiatives mentioned earlier seeks, at least in 
part, to change a particular environment, such as making schools, workplaces, public 
places, and transportation more accessible.  
 
Technological and other innovations have enabled people with serious physical and 
mental conditions to work productively, have changed the nature of work itself so that 
people with some physical and mental conditions can work, or have modified the work 
environment to accommodate workers with serious physical or mental conditions. These 
innovations have made it much easier for disability recipients to work today than two 
decades ago and have denigrated the medical model of disability among disability rights 
advocates. The types of disabilities among nonelderly adults are changing as well. Fewer 
workers experience acute illnesses such as heart attacks and strokes, and when they do, 
they are more likely to happen after retirement. Instead, more people with mental 
disorders, arthritis, back pain, and repetitive stress injuries are applying for SSI and DI.  
 
No Change in Income Support Policy  
 
Despite the emergence of the social/environmental model of disability, the two largest 
income support programs for working-age people with disabilities, SSDI and SSI, 
continue to reflect their historical roots and the discredited medical model. In 2002, these 
programs, along with the public health insurance benefits programs to which most 
participants are automatically entitled, accounted for about 75 percent of federal and state 
expenditures on working-age people with disabilities (Goodman and Stapleton 2005).  
 
This year, 2006, marks the fiftieth anniversary of the SSDI program. In 1956, the Social 
Security retirement program was expanded to provide replacement income to workers 
over age fifty who could no longer work because of disability. Benefit amounts are 
essentially based on the same formulas applied to retirees; that is, they depend on the 
individual’s past contributions to the program’s financing, through payroll taxes. In other 
words, the program extended retirement benefits to those who needed to retire early 
because of a medical condition. In 1960, SSDI was expanded to cover workers of any age 
who had made sufficient payroll tax contributions and could no longer engage in a 
“substantial gainful activity,” or SGA, that is, could no longer work enough to earn more 
than a minimal amount (in 2006, $860 per month for nonblind beneficiaries and $1,450 
for blind beneficiaries). The basic concept of the program, early retirement insurance for 
medical reasons, remained unchanged. In December 2004, the average disabled-worker 
beneficiary received $894 in benefits. Those entitled to spousal benefits received an 
average additional $233, and those with children received an average additional $257. 
But the amount of benefits varied widely. In the same month, 3.3 percent of disabled-
worker beneficiaries received less than $300 for just themselves, and 2.6 percent received 
more than $1,700 (SSA 2005, tables 5.E1 and 5.E2), reflecting differences in past 
earnings and payroll tax payments.  
 
SSI is a means-tested poverty program for elderly and disabled people, and its benefit 
levels are much lower. The federal program replaced the existing state programs in 1974. 
To determine disability, the federal program uses SSDI medical eligibility criteria. What 
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distinguishes SSI from SSDI is that it is targeted to people with low incomes and limited 
resources. In 2005, unmarried SSI beneficiaries with no other income received a 
maximum of $564 in monthly benefits, or 72.6 percent of the federal poverty guideline 
for a one-person household; married couples with both individuals eligible and no other 
income received $846, or 81.3 percent of the federal poverty guideline for a two-person 
household. In December 2004, 8.5 percent of individual working-age recipients with 
disabilities received less than $50, and 55.4 percent received the individual maximum, 
$564 (SSA 2005, tables 2.B1 and 7.C1). 
  
To become eligible for either program, an individual must demonstrate an “inability to 
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to last for a 
continuous period of not less than twelve months” (italics added; SSA 1986). In other 
words, the program defines disability as an inability to work due to a medical condition, 
without reference to the environment.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious evidence that the medical basis for the current system is badly 
flawed is the failure of the disability determination process, which was designed to 
implement the statutory definition of inability to work. The problems with the process 
have been well documented (General Accounting Office 1997, 2004; Social Security 
Advisory Board 2003). Despite the millions of dollars that a succession of SSA 
administrators have spent to fix the determination process, almost one-third of those who 
receive benefits receive them only after appealing an initial denial. Furthermore, the 
initial application process can take many months, especially in the case of a denial, and 
the appeals process can take much longer. Thus, many applicants who eventually prove 
to be eligible must go through a very long period—a year or more is not uncommon—
when they do not know even whether they will receive benefits. Although many 
eligibility reversals on appeal may be the result of changes in medical conditions, SSA 
statistics show that many are allowed on evidence that was available to the initial 
examiner (Stapleton and Pugh 2001). The number of reversals of ineligibility for those 
who do appeal is relatively high (about 60 to 65 percent). There is convincing evidence 
also that the medical eligibility criteria are applied inconsistently across states (Gallichio 
and Bye 1980) and even across adjudicators within the same office (Stapleton and Pugh 
2001; Social Security Advisory Board 2003).  
 
On August 1, 2006, SSA substantially changed its disability determination process, with 
the hope of improving the consistency of decisions and shortening the processing time. 
But the new process does not address the main issue of the law itself, for the inability to 
work cannot be determined medically. Many working people have conditions that meet 
SSA’s medical eligibility criteria, such as those who use a wheelchair, have a profound 
vision or hearing impairment, or have another disability. Nonetheless, the determination 
process presumes that such individuals are not able to work or can work only minimally 
based on one condition: that they are currently not working. Thus, the first step in the 
“medical” determination process is a work test: has the applicant earned less than the 
SGA amount for at least five months?  
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The disability determination process implicitly acknowledges that medical criteria alone 
do not determine whether somebody can earn more than the SGA, because the very first 
step screens out applicants who earn more than the SGA, regardless of their medical 
condition. If Congress were to allow the SSA to drop this work test and provide benefits 
to all who meet the medical criteria, millions of workers would likely qualify, thereby 
greatly accelerating the already significant growth in the disability programs’ costs. But if 
Congress were to limit eligibility to only those with medical conditions resulting in no 
capacity to work above the SGA, millions would lose their benefits and many would 
suffer. No application would be allowed, for instance, solely on the basis of a significant 
vision impairment, a profound hearing impairment, or paralysis in both legs.  
 
The reality is that medical advances, technical progress, and social change have created a 
world in which many people with disabilities are placed in an ever-broadening gray area 
between “able to work” and “not able to work.” Nonmedical characteristics of the 
individual and environment have become increasingly important to determining a 
person’s ability to work. A growing portion of people with disabilities can work at some 
level but still need some type of assistance so they can attain or maintain a reasonable 
standard of living. Yet the Social Security Act contains the notion of a narrow, medically 
determinable line between those who can work above the SGA and those who cannot.  
 
The Poverty Trap of Today’s Support Policies  
 
Today’s income support programs and other policies that assume that people with certain 
physical or mental conditions cannot work create a poverty trap for many people with 
disabilities, because of both their paternalistic nature and their inability to keep up with 
societal changes. Instead of helping and encouraging people with disabilities to use their 
own abilities to stay out of, or escape from, poverty, they are built on the presumption 
that people with disabilities cannot work, and so they must provide most with low levels 
of benefits. Today’s policies do too little to help people with disabilities lift themselves 
out of poverty by using their own abilities or to help them avoid falling into poverty in 
the first place. These programs also reinforce society’s unrealistically low expectations 
about the ability of people with disabilities to participate successfully in the labor market.  
 
The poverty trap has four components. The first is the determination of eligibility for 
Social Security disability programs discussed earlier. When people apply for disability 
insurance benefits, they must demonstrate to the SSA that they cannot work, must have 
worked long enough to qualify for benefits, must not be currently working, and must 
meet the SSA’s medical eligibility criteria. Although many applicants for both SSDI and 
SSI may truly be unable to work, a significant number may actually be able to work, 
except for episodic symptoms of long-term conditions, inadequate health care, lack of 
reasonable accommodation, or limited skills that may greatly limit their employment 
opportunities. If these people’s symptoms abate, if they receive rehabilitation or other 
training, or if an employer makes an accommodation, these applicants may be able to 
work at some future time. By instituting the nine-month trial work period in 1960 (which 
enables SSDI beneficiaries to work for nine months without losing their benefits) and 
other work incentives throughout the 1980s, policymakers recognized this possibility. But 
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the extensive waiting period for eligibility (the determination process can take many 
months, plus SSDI’s five-month waiting period) means that instead of trying to reenter 
employment during this period, applicants are encouraged to remain idle. Many may be 
learning for the first time that people with disabilities are not expected to work. They also 
will learn that when they do return to work, they will lose all or some of their benefits 
and risk losing their public health insurance.  
 
Loss of benefits is the second important component of the poverty trap. The current rules 
sharply reduce benefits as a beneficiary’s earnings increase. SSDI beneficiaries can earn 
up to the SGA without a loss of benefits, but after subtracting certain work-related 
expenses, if their earnings exceed the SGA amount by as little as one dollar and they 
have “used up” their trial work period, they will face the “earnings cliff; that is, they will 
lose all SSDI cash benefits if their earnings increase by any amount. Because many 
beneficiaries’ benefits are above the SGA, their loss of income can actually be greater 
than their earnings. For example, those with SSDI benefits of $900 (not uncommon for 
beneficiaries with children or those with moderate before-disability earnings) will lose 
their entire benefit check if they earn $861 per month, the equivalent of $6.50 per hour 
for thirty hours per week. In addition, those SSDI beneficiaries on the rolls for less than 
twenty-four months will lose their opportunity to become eligible for Medicare, because 
of the twenty-four-month Medicare waiting period after the five-month SSDI waiting 
period ends. Once SSDI beneficiaries become eligible for Medicare, they can maintain 
their eligibility for eight years and can purchase Medicare coverage after that if they lose 
cash benefits because of their earnings.  
 
SSI recipients face a different constraint: after their earnings reach $65 per month, their 
benefits are reduced by one dollar for every two dollars of additional earnings under 
SSI’s Section 1619(a) program. Put differently, SSI recipients’ income is implicitly taxed 
at a rate of 50 percent, a higher tax rate on earnings than that paid by even the wealthiest 
individuals. Indeed, the tax rate is even higher when considering payroll taxes, federal 
and state income taxes, or the possible loss of housing subsidies, food stamps, or other 
benefits. Moreover, because benefits cannot be adjusted during the month in which the 
income is earned, the beneficiaries often must reimburse the SSA for past benefit 
overpayments. SSI recipients who are eligible for Medicaid do not, however, risk losing 
their benefits as long as they continue to meet the SSI’s medical eligibility requirements. 
They will continue to receive benefits even if they earn enough to reduce their SSI 
payments to zero, provided that their total income does not exceed a cap, which varies by 
state.  
 
These rules penalize beneficiaries who try to augment their incomes through earnings, by 
means of benefit reductions that amount to high taxes on those earnings. For beneficiaries 
who are capable of returning to work and earn a monthly income much greater than their 
benefit payments (i.e., several thousand dollars per month), these penalties may be fairly 
inconsequential; that is, such beneficiaries can substantially increase their incomes 
through work, despite the penalties. Beneficiaries who are not capable of doing so, 
however, are trapped. They can raise their income through earnings to some extent, but 
the program rules create disincentives for them to do so beyond a minimal amount, and 
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their limited job opportunities mean that if they leave the rolls entirely, they still will 
have little income.  
 
Some experts have argued that the work disincentives associated with the income support 
programs are small. They point out that the maximum SSI benefit is below the poverty 
level and that the SSDI wage replacement rate (benefits divided by a measure of past 
earnings) also is low (Reno, Mashaw, and Gradison 1997). Both assumptions are correct 
and imply that the programs are not exceptionally generous; nonetheless, the work 
disincentives are stronger than these facts seem to imply, for several reasons.  
 
SSA’s actuaries estimate that the replacement rate ranges from 25 percent for those who 
earned $87,000 per year before entering the program (“high-earnings” beneficiaries) to 
56 percent for those who earned $15,600 (“low-earnings” beneficiaries) (Office of the 
Actuary, SSA 2004). These relatively low replacement rates understate the size of the 
work disincentives. First, beneficiaries who return to work may lose some or all other 
benefits tied to disability. Second, because benefits receive more favorable tax treatment 
than earnings do, a dollar of earnings is worth less than a dollar of benefits. Third, due to 
their disability, the beneficiaries’ potential earnings are likely to be lower than past 
earnings, so the replacement rate for potential earnings may be much higher than the 
replacement rate for past earnings. Fourth, the conventionally computed replacement rate 
does not consider that beneficiaries can earn up to the SGA and retain their earnings. For 
these beneficiaries, it is their potential earnings up to the SGA that should be in the 
denominator of the replacement rate. Consider a person who earns the SGA of $860 per 
month and receives benefitsof$800.If her maximum potential earnings are less than $800 
above the SGA, she cannot increase her income by increasing work. For this beneficiary, 
the relevant replacement rate—the reduction in benefits divided by the potential increase 
in earnings—is 100 percent or greater.  
 
Some policymakers might be tempted to address the incentive issue by simply lowering 
either the benefits or the SGA. That would likely increase employment and earnings and 
reduce benefit payments, but it would also harm the many beneficiaries who are unable to 
work or who would find work to be a significant hardship. The benefits are not very 
generous, as noted earlier, and many beneficiaries live in or close to poverty. Presumably 
they would not be participating in the program if they had better alternatives. 
Policymakers interested in improving the well-being of people with disabilities, or at 
least not diminishing it, must realize that benefit cuts alone do just the opposite.  
 
The third major component of the poverty trap is the complexity and poor coordination of 
support systems for people with disabilities, which extends beyond the fact that eligibility 
for many in-kind programs is contingent on earnings. The many in-kind supports 
available to people with disabilities—medical benefits, personal assistance, assistance 
with technology purchases, food, housing, transportation, education, and others— are 
administered by a variety of state and federal agencies and private organizations, each 
with its own rules, many of which are very complex. Substantial numbers of people with 
disabilities also receive cash benefits from programs other than SSDI and SSI, especially 
workers’ compensation, private disability insurance, veterans’ pensions or compensation, 
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and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Although these programs alleviate 
poverty for many, they also interact with SSDI and SSI in ways that are hard to 
understand and, in some cases, exacerbate work disincentives. Understanding, obtaining, 
and managing the various supports requires substantial effort. People with disabilities 
often must spend additional time doing everyday tasks, such as dressing, using public 
transportation rather than driving, or managing information. That effort reduces time and 
energy available for productive activities. As Oi (1978, 1992) noted, “Disability steals 
time.” The inefficiency of our current support system steals even more.  
 
The support system’s complexity also makes it very prone to errors. Some errors are 
committed by recipients because they do not understand the supports, how they interact, 
and their own responsibilities or because they just do not have the resources needed to 
comply with the program’s rules. Other errors are committed by administrators, whose 
budgets and technical resources are often inadequate for completing complex tasks. One 
result is errors that can temporarily disrupt productive activities entirely. Complexity and 
errors also can lead to profound distrust of the system. As a result, those who receive 
supports often are reluctant to try something new, believing that they cannot rely on the 
system to support them, even if it would.  
 
The final key component of the poverty trap is related to the other components: the self-
fulfilling expectation, ingrained in the support system, that people with disabilities cannot 
support themselves or, perhaps worse, do not want to support themselves. When program 
administrators, staff, and members of the general public see that people with disabilities 
rely on public programs rather than work as their primary support, they conclude that 
such people cannot work or do not want to work. Some even advise against their working, 
because of the consequences for their supports. Thus, the programs foster low 
expectations for self-sufficiency and dependence becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This 
culture is particularly harmful to individuals just beginning to adjust to a disability or a 
setback in health. Although people’s own expectations may naturally decrease with an 
adjustment to disability, policies and programs should help them sustain high 
expectations rather than reinforce broad societal messages that lower them.  
 
In this policy environment, many people with significant functional limitations and a 
relatively low earnings capacity face the following choice: They can work, receive wages, 
perhaps obtain some in-kind supports, and live in or near poverty. Or they can severely 
limit their work, navigate the support system, and receive income and in-kind benefits 
that also leave them in or near poverty. They are trapped. But a successful economic self-
sufficiency policy would enable them to escape.  
 
The Inadequacy of Current Initiatives and Reforms  
 
Despite the intent of the many current policy reforms and initiatives, it seems unlikely 
that they will substantially improve the economic self-sufficiency of people with 
disabilities and offer them a higher standard of living, for three reasons. First, they do not 
adequately address work disincentives; second, they increase the already excessive 
complexity of the current support system; and third, they fail to address the unrealistically 
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low expectations of the work capacity of individuals with disabilities when appropriate 
supports are provided.  
 
The Ticket to Work Program (TTW) illustrates these three points. TTW was designed to 
help beneficiaries find gainful employment with sufficient earnings to enable them to 
leave the benefit rolls. SSA beneficiaries receive tickets they can assign to participating 
providers called Employment Networks (ENs) for training and employment assistance. 
SSA pays the ENs according to one of two schedules over a period of five years or longer. 
If the EN is to obtain the maximum payments under both schedules, the beneficiary must 
return to work and leave the rolls for at least sixty months. In effect, the EN receives a 
portion of program savings for helping beneficiaries go off benefits. State Vocational 
Rehabilitation Agencies can serve as ENs or can serve beneficiaries under a third, 
previously existing SSA payment system that has a performance incentive but does not 
require leaving the beneficiary rolls. The complex payment structure; the need for up-
front capital to purchase training, equipment, and other services to make beneficiaries 
employable; and extensive paperwork requirements have discouraged many organizations 
from participating as ENs. A second problem is that TTW fails to address most of the 
SSI’s and SSDI’s work disincentives. Beneficiaries who redeem their tickets, receive 
training, and find employment still face the same SSDI earnings cliff and sharp 
reductions in SSI benefits as they did before the TTW. EN staff interviewed as part of 
SSA’s evaluation effort explained that once some beneficiaries discover that TTW’s goal 
is to increase beneficiaries’ earnings enough to make them ineligible for benefits, they 
lose interest quickly (Thornton et al. 2004). Finally, the TTW program has not addressed 
societal expectations. To date, it has included only very limited marketing to employers, 
beneficiaries, or the general public about the program participants’ work capacity.  
 
The Medicaid buy-in program also illustrates these points. This program enables states to 
offer health insurance to working people with disabilities under a sliding premium scale, 
without losing benefits. As of the end of 2005, thirty-two states had active programs.1 
Indeed, many states’ implementation of the Medicaid buy-in falls short of the program’s 
goal—if they have implemented it at all. In all but a few states, income and asset 
eligibility limits for buy-in programs are rather restrictive, especially for SSDI 
beneficiaries receiving relatively high SSDI benefits. In addition, the program rules 
regarding income, assets, and proof of work effort can be very difficult for people with 
disabilities and eligibility workers to understand. In many instances, because of 
automated eligibility systems that enroll individuals in various categories of Medicaid 
eligibility based on information submitted at application, a person may not even be aware 
that he or she is enrolled in a special Medicaid category that permits higher levels of 
earnings without loss of eligibility. Another problem noted by many representatives of 
state Medicaid buy-in programs is that the programs are able to address only one aspect 
of the work disincentives facing people with disabilities: loss of public health insurance 
owing to increased earnings. Moreover, the effectiveness of buy-in programs in 
promoting employment and self-sufficiency is severely hampered by the work 
disincentives associated with the SSDI cash cliff. Finally, marketing efforts so far have 
been very limited (Goodman and Livermore 2004).  
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Thus far, policymakers have taken a piecemeal approach to policy changes promising to 
promote economic self-sufficiency and increase the standard of living for people with 
disabilities. Reformers seem to be trying to at least partially correct specific problems 
with specific programs, but without addressing the many other problems that need to be 
corrected. In doing so, the reforms only make the programs more complicated and make 
them even harder to administer, but they fail to address their long-term fiscal health.  
 
Disability Policy Goals  
 
For people both with and without disabilities, support programs strive to achieve several 
goals, including  
 
• Adequacy: assistance levels should be adequate and keep people out of poverty.  
• Equity: assistance programs should provide comparable levels of  
assistance for people in similar situations.  
• Efficacy: assistance programs should identify individuals who need  
support and reject those who do not.  
• Positive incentives: recipients should be encouraged to help themselves, or at least not 
be discouraged from doing so.  
• Simplicity: the program should be easy for the target population to  
understand and easy for the government to administer.  
• Efficiency: the program should achieve its goals using as few resources as possible.  
• Fiscal and political sustainability: the program must have the ongoing support of 
taxpayers in order to remain stable and survive.  
 
These goals have trade-offs; that is, emphasizing one goal often affects the achievement 
of another. For example, the goal of creating positive incentives seems directly at odds 
with the goal of providing adequate support to people just because they have little income; 
the availability of support from the program reduces the incentive for people to help 
themselves; and adequate support to keep eligible beneficiaries out of poverty could 
result in a program that is fiscally and politically unsustainable.  
 
When the SSDI program was established, its purpose was to provide income replacement 
for individuals who could no longer work because of disability. Adequacy, efficiency, 
efficacy, and equity were emphasized over positive incentives because of the prevailing 
attitudes toward disability at the time and the belief that this was the most efficient 
approach. One could argue that during the program’s early years, these goals were met. 
But as time passed, policymakers expanded the target population to help others who 
clearly needed assistance: younger people and people with medical conditions more 
difficult to diagnose. These expansions had the effect of blurring the line between those 
who could and could not work. Advances in technology and medical care further blurred 
the line. The model of income replacement after retirement became less and less 
appropriate, and as a result, the program’s work disincentives became more and more 
problematic. Both participation in the program and its expenditures swelled; the program 
became less efficient and now appears to be unsustainable, especially in the face of 
current federal budget projections.  
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We therefore need to shift our thinking and reorient disability programs to new and 
innovative ways of changing these goals to reflect today’s realities. Instead of piecemeal 
changes to programs that are already too complex, we need systemwide reforms that 
fundamentally change support policies by replacing today’s outdated policies with 
economic self-sufficiency policies. This reorientation may not be smooth or easy, and 
hammering out the details of such major policy change will be difficult. Such wholesale 
reforms require principles to guide them. We recognize that these program elements 
cannot be specific at this stage, but we hope that discussing these principles will bring 
U.S. disability policy closer to a system encouraging economic self-sufficiency. A 
holistic approach to policy reform, rather than the adoption of one or two of these 
principles, is more likely to bring real and lasting change that will empower millions of 
people with disabilities to escape poverty. It is noteworthy that some European countries 
are actively considering many of these principles in their own efforts to reform disability 
policies (Marin, Prinz, & Queisser 2004; Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2003).  
 
Broadly speaking, the overall goal of the new system—and the one most difficult to 
achieve—should be maximum economic self-sufficiency at a reasonable standard of 
living for every person facing a significant challenge to employment because of 
functional limitations. This goal implies providing a reasonable standard of living 
(adequacy) along with work incentives that promote employment.  
 
We advocate eliminating the inability-to-work requirement in favor of systemwide 
eligibility criteria designed to identify people with significant functional limitations, 
defined in the International Classification of Function as “a significant deviation or loss 
in body physiology or structure, such as loss of sensation in extremities, visual or hearing 
loss, paralysis, or anxiety” (World Health Organization 2001). Although some medical 
criteria will be needed to determine who is eligible for any support from the system, the 
eligibility criteria should move toward a functional definition of disability as 
recommended by others (e.g., Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
2003); they should not include a work test or be designed to determine an inability to 
work. Put another way, we recommend uniform criteria for eligibility across all programs 
that do not use an inability-to-work standard.  
 
This does not mean, however, that all people meeting the eligibility criteria should 
automatically receive cash assistance and other support, regardless of their earnings or 
other factors. Instead, the eligibility decision should be separate from decisions about the 
specific assistance to be provided. We recognize that those people who currently work 
and receive no program support would be tempted to apply for eligibility. In other words, 
the new eligibility criteria would likely encompass many who are not currently receiving 
benefits. So if eligibility automatically triggered substantial cash and health benefits, as it 
does under the current system, the program’s costs would likely rise substantially. Instead, 
we propose more equitable strategies that would more efficiently offer support to all 
those meeting the new eligibility criteria—support designed to help many help 
themselves and reduce their reliance on public support. The advantage of this approach is 
that those who risk losing income owing to their disability will be identified early, and 
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intervention can start early, when that risk becomes a reality, rather than after a long 
disability determination process during which applicants are not employed and may not 
have the medical or other services they need.  
 
One way to reduce the demand for cash support would be to establish a rebuttable 
presumption of ability to work. The presumption would be that with appropriate supports, 
all eligible individuals could work and at least partially support themselves, despite the 
challenges posed by their functional limitation. This presumption could be automatically 
rebutted for those with the most severe impairments, but others would be expected to 
make good-faith efforts to work over an extended period, after which some might be 
classified as unable to work.  
 
We emphasize that this presumption should not invalidate the other principles listed, as 
that would cause great harm to many people with disabilities. Deciding on equitable 
criteria to rebut the presumption of ability to work that are not subject to litigation will be 
difficult. Examples of disabilities that would rebut the presumption of ability to work 
would likely include those with sufficiently extreme functional limitations; those with a 
very short life expectancy due to illness or injury; those whose functional limitations are 
increasing owing to a chronic medical condition; and those who, despite appropriate 
supports (e.g., assistive technology, rehabilitation, supported employment), cannot find 
employment despite good-faith efforts. Those who successfully rebutted the presumption 
of ability would receive cash benefits and would be allowed to work, if they chose to, 
without penalty. Many of the medical eligibility criteria used for SSDI and SSI may be 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of ability to work, but many others would not be.  
 
In accordance with the current system, the level of any cash benefits could depend on 
how much the beneficiary has contributed to the Social Security Trust Funds; that is, one 
of the rewards of working is better disability benefits. The benefits for those who have 
not contributed enough to the Trust Fund would be means-tested, as they are under 
today’s SSI program, although the means test would have to be revised to allow 
recipients to earn their way out of poverty.  
 
Incentives that make work pay would be a key component of the new system, with the 
goal of providing work incentives receiving a higher priority than under the current 
system. Those able to obtain only low-wage jobs or to work only a few hours would 
receive wage subsidies or tax credits offering them an incentive to work and improve 
their standard of living.  
 
Those persons who could not attain a reasonable standard of living without it would 
receive financial support. Those who rebut the presumption of ability to work and those 
who cannot earn enough on a sustained basis would be eligible for sufficient income and 
in-kind benefits to give them a reasonable standard of living, considering any disability-
related expenses they incur. The intent of this support would be to raise their income to 
the standard established as reasonable.  
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Those able to earn only a small amount would also be given incentives to improve their 
financial literacy, save money, acquire assets, and make investments. The current SSI 
program prevents recipients from escaping poverty because of stringent restrictions on 
their acquisition of wealth. We envision a program that instead would help such persons 
escape poverty through positive incentives to acquire wealth, up to a certain limit. One 
example is individual development accounts in which some of beneficiaries’ savings 
would be matched by outside sources, including employers (as many now do for 
retirement benefits), family members, and charitable organizations. Such incentives need 
not be costly, because once the recipients acquire enough money, they would become 
more self-sufficient.  
 
The early and timely provision of supports likely to help first-time workers entering the 
workforce and help workers adjusting to the onset of a disability or its exacerbation stay 
employed should become a cornerstone of rehabilitation efforts. People should not have 
to wait for an application for income support benefits to be processed before receiving 
rehabilitation. But this speedup will require much better coordination between 
rehabilitation support and public and private benefits than under the current system, 
making it possible to identify much earlier those at risk for losing their job. Moreover, 
those unable to rebut the presumption of ability to work will have a strong incentive to 
make good use of rehabilitation services.  
 
Beneficiaries and, as needed, their agents/representatives should be given substantial 
control over the delivery of supports. For instance, rehabilitation programs could adopt 
the empowerment model used by centers for independent living, under which 
beneficiaries have more control over the delivery of supports. When feasible, they would 
be allowed to choose the providers, and some options would allow them to obtain 
services without interrupting their work activities.  
 
Both beneficiaries and providers should be responsible for achieving the program’s goals. 
The beneficiaries would be given stronger incentives to contribute to their own support 
and, when possible, would be held responsible for doing so. For those who have not 
rebutted the presumption of ability to work, this would include work effort requirements. 
Program administrators and staff would be held to a similar standard. Accordingly, errors 
in administration or the failure to take timely action on behalf of a beneficiary could 
result in penalties payable to the beneficiary. For example, a beneficiary who begins 
working and accurately reports his or her earnings but still receives overpayments should 
not be penalized for them. Helping beneficiaries achieve economic self-sufficiency and a 
reasonable standard of living and the success of their effort would be the principal criteria 
for assessing the program’s performance. The implementation and enforcement of such 
requirements also would help alleviate beneficiaries’ distrust of the current programs’ 
federal and state administrators.  
 
Individuals should have access to health care and assistive technology that is not linked to 
employment. Access to health care should not be a disincentive to work and should not 
stand in the way of treatment needed to return to work. Eligible individuals, particularly 
those with chronic conditions or requiring personal assistance, should have access to 
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assistive technology or other long-term services, regardless of their employment status. 
Persons with impairments who currently are working would be eligible for health 
insurance, assistive technology, and other supports to enable them to keep their job, 
regardless of their eligibility for cash benefits. Employers might be expected to contribute 
to the cost of their health care, as they do for other workers, and those with an income 
higher than that needed for a reasonable standard of living would be charged sliding-scale 
premiums, similar to those of the Medicaid buy-in program.  
 
Other supports should be well coordinated, encourage work, easy to navigate, tailored to 
individual needs, and efficiently delivered. Beneficiaries would access support services 
through a single point of entry in the system rather than separately from multiple agencies 
and administrators. Supports like assistive technology and rehabilitation would not be 
contingent on work except to the extent that they are needed to support work. Providers 
would be paid through a system encouraging them to meet individuals’ needs efficiently. 
Those with an income higher than that needed to support a reasonable standard of living 
would be expected to pay, on a sliding scale, for some of the services. Likewise, 
employers would be expected to contribute to the extent that such services might 
substitute for benefits they offered to other workers (e.g., under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act) or for expenses falling under the ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” 
requirement for covered employers. Employer disability insurance and pension plans, 
along with workers’ compensation insurance, would be integrated to support the 
objectives of the public program. To the extent practical, people with disabilities would 
receive support services (e.g., health care, education, training, job search, and 
transportation) from the same providers that deliver similar services to others.  
 
Finally, system reforms must be accompanied by public awareness campaigns designed 
to raise societal expectations about the work capacity of people with disabilities. Policy 
changes in line with the principles described earlier should gradually lead to more public 
awareness of the capabilities of people with disabilities and greater understanding of their 
value to society. But these changes will come slowly and may falter without a significant 
and sustained effort to address misconceptions and raise society’s awareness of the work 
capacity of people with disabilities. The message of the campaign might be that workers 
with disabilities are a significant economic resource, to encourage leaders to recognize 
that tapping into that resource is an important opportunity, especially as the baby boom 
generation enters its retirement years, which is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the 
U.S. economy today.  
 
The Many Challenges to Further Reforms  
 
The greatest challenge to reform is cost. The readers of this article may imagine that a 
program following the principles just described is not affordable. Currently, the primary 
objective of program reforms usually is a reduction in spending, and much of the interest 
in the disability policy reform is based on concerns about the fiscal health of the largest 
programs serving people with disabilities. Hence, if they are to attract political support, 
any reforms will need to promise less growth of expenditures and/or more growth of 
revenues, through income and payroll taxes. A well-designed system could offset the 
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political pressure to reduce expenditure growth with features that voters generally support, 
such as greater personal responsibility for one’s own actions and well-being, more 
efficient use of public resources, and a more equitable distribution of benefits.  
 
We are convinced that a well-designed program could reduce expenditure growth by 
making better use of existing resources. The most important of these resources is the 
ability of people with disabilities to help themselves, which under our current system is 
often discounted. Added to this are the resources currently wasted by a complex, poorly 
integrated, inefficient system of supports that could be used effectively in a reformed 
system.  
 
Even if we are right, reform faces many other hurdles. How can we extract the resources 
from the many largely independent public programs that now serve people with 
disabilities, all with their own self-interested stakeholders? How can a government 
bureaucracy effectively administer benefits that are tailored to the support needs of an 
extremely heterogeneous population? Most important, how can we avoid irreparably 
harming millions of those we intend to help as we move to a new system and experiment 
with a new approach?  
 
Many more problematic design issues must be addressed, and another article would be 
required to address them all. For example, the eligibility determination process would 
need to be mapped out. Even though the new process would have a less contentious 
purpose than the current process does, it could demand more information to determine 
support needs. Furthermore, we need a process to rebut the presumption of ability to 
work. If those who are successful are allowed to work without penalty, consistent with 
the policy goal, they might have a strong incentive to rebut the presumption of ability to 
work—incentives that would be as problematic for this process as they are now. Whether 
or not such incentives are problematic depends on both the generosity of benefits for 
those who work and the extent to which policy changes raise individual and social 
expectations about the ability of people with disabilities to work. This example illustrates 
a fundamental design issue: a change in one design feature (e.g., work incentives) has 
implications for many other design features (e.g., eligibility determination). There are 
many tradeoffs to consider, and the development of a program that will meet our policy 
goals will require extensive investments in the design and testing of various program 
features.  
 
Reasons for Optimism  
 
Given these challenges, there are many reasons for pessimism about the design and 
implementation of reforms that will move toward the objective of greater economic self-
sufficiency and better living standards. There are, however, important reasons for 
optimism.  
 
Historically, the response of people with disabilities to fewer incentives to work provides 
considerable reason for optimism. Ample anecdotal evidence as well as some empirical 
evidence shows that many disability program beneficiaries restrain their earnings only to 
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preserve their eligibility for public income support and health benefits (O’Day and 
Killeen 2002; Stapleton and Tucker 2000). Research also shows that many people who 
enter disability programs do so only after losing their job, for reasons outside their 
disability, such as layoffs due to a recession or industrial restructuring (Stapleton, 
Wittenburg, and Maag 2004). Between 1984 and 2003, Duggan and Imberman (2006) 
attributed 24 percent of the SSDI’s growth for men and 12 percent of its growth for 
women to two significant recessions. They traced another 28 percent of the growth for 
men and 24 percent for women to rises in earnings inequality that, because of the way 
that SSA indexes past earnings, increased the earnings replacement rate for those with 
few skills. Their analysis attributed another 53 percent of the growth for men and 38 
percent for women to regulatory changes in eligibility requirements, especially related to 
psychiatric conditions and to pain related to musculoskeletal disorders. Autor and 
Duggan (2003) earlier showed that these same factors reduced the employment of people 
with disabilities during this period.  
 
We do not intend to suggest that those entering the SSDI rolls because of the economic 
changes just described are somehow unworthy of support or that the changes in eligibility 
rules were unwarranted. In fact, we suspect that most reasonable taxpayers would 
conclude that most of those entering the programs because of these changes are worthy of 
support. Instead, we are pointing to the historical evidence that people with disabilities 
work less, and rely more on public support, when their incentive to work is undermined 
by our current programs or changes in the economy. Many work up to the level at which 
they can retain their benefits. It seems reasonable to expect, therefore, that many people 
will try harder to support themselves in response to policy reforms that encourage them to 
work.  
 
Furthermore, a well-designed policy could have wide-ranging effects. One line of 
research based on the historical record estimates that around 30 to 40 percent of SSDI 
applicants would work if it were not for the disincentives associated with the SSDI 
program (Bound 1989, 1991; Bound, Burkhauser, and Nichols 2001; Chen and van der 
Klauuw 2005; Parsons 1991). Duggan and Imberman’s findings (2006) also suggest that 
a well-designed program would have a large impact, as they attributed 82 percent of the 
SSDI growth for men and 72 percent for women between 1984 and 2003 to factors that 
discouraged working.  
 
The experience of the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Compensation program 
(VADC) for veterans who become disabled on active duty also offers some 
encouragement. Eligible veterans receive benefits, regardless of their earnings. Like 
SSDI and SSI, eligibility is based on medical evidence and is intended to reflect a 
person’s ability to work. But there is no work test. In addition, the outcome of the 
determination may be a specified “partial disability,” in which the veteran receives a 
percentage of the full benefit.  
 
An examination of data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation reveals 
that earnings are substantially greater and poverty is significantly lower among 
beneficiaries of this program than among their counterparts on SSI or SSDI. For example, 
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poverty rates among nonelderly adult recipients of VADC benefits were 8 percent in 
2001 versus 40 percent and 22 percent for SSI and SSDI recipients, respectively (Duggan, 
Rosenheck, and Singleton 2006). This improvement was largely because their earnings 
were much higher ($2,300 per month) than the earnings of those on SSI and/or SSDI (just 
$80 per month on average). Although this difference may reflect differences in disability 
type, health, or other beneficiary characteristics, it does suggest that removing work 
disincentives for disability recipients would increase their work effort and lower the 
likelihood of their being in poverty.  
 
Autor and Duggan (2006) suggest considering reforms of SSDI that would follow the 
VADC model (i.e., no restrictions on earnings and partial benefits to control costs). 
Others, however, believe that this approach would be problematic because more workers 
would become eligible for benefits and because applicants and advocates would press for 
a greater percentage of disability associated with their specific conditions or 
combinations of conditions.  
 
Whether or not VADC is a viable model for SSDI reforms, the program’s experience is 
encouraging in that it demonstrates the ability of people with severe disabilities to 
contribute substantially to their own support and help keep themselves out of poverty.  
 
The private disability insurance (PDI) industry, which helps employees with private 
disability insurance coverage to return to work, may also be an instructive model. PDI 
companies have a vested interest in their beneficiaries’ returning to work, as they must 
pay cash benefits to those who do not. PDI companies use many of our recommendations. 
They target beneficiaries who, they believe, can return to work and use their close 
relationships with employers to keep their job or, for those who cannot return to their 
previous position, find a new job. Although rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of 
such efforts is rare (O’Leary and Dean 1998), recent research demonstrates their promise 
(Allaire, Li, and LaValley 2003; Mitra, Corden, and Thornton 2005). Private disability 
insurers also use lump-sum payouts and benefit offsets, to reduce both their liability and 
their work disincentives.  
 
One difficult feature of the current policy is that PDI benefits interact with SSDI benefits 
to discourage private insurers’ efforts to return clients to work because PDI benefits are 
reduced by one dollar for every dollar of SSDI benefits received. At some point, it 
becomes more cost-effective for the private insurer to help their clients obtain SSDI 
coverage rather than continuing to try to return them to work. A disability policy that is 
oriented toward greater self-sufficiency would, instead, encourage such efforts. One 
approach would establish a private-public benefit under which the government would 
compensate PDI companies for administering a combined benefit.  
 
Changes in U.S. family policy through passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, the 1993 expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit for 
low-income families, and related state policy changes in the 1990s also provide reason 
for optimism. Researchers have found that if incentives to work are strengthened and 
work expectations and supports are built into public policy, the employment, earnings, 
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and economic self-sufficiency of a historically dependent population—mostly unmarried 
mothers—can be significantly increased over a very short period. Even progressive critics 
of the reforms have been astonished by the size of the impacts (Winship and Jencks 
2004). Interestingly, the reforms did little to slow the growth of government expenditures 
on families, as the growth of tax credits outpaced the declines in welfare benefits, yet 
they remain popular with the electorate because of their orientation to work and personal 
responsibility (Besharov 2003).  
 
This does not mean that family policy reforms offer a blueprint for disability policy 
reforms (Burkhauser and Stapleton 2004b; Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003). In fact, the 
experiences of low-income families under family policy reform provide much reason for 
caution. Moreover, the combination of changes to incentives, work expectations, and 
supports hurt some families even while helping others. In many cases, earnings gains 
may not have been enough to compensate for both benefit reductions and the increase in 
parental work effort. Many parents with disabilities were exempted from work 
requirements, and the states found it cost-effective, from their own perspective, to push 
them onto SSI, rather than give them the supports they might need to work. Those not 
exempted or not eligible for SSI continue to struggle with the new work requirements and 
inadequate work supports. If disability reforms followed in the footsteps of welfare 
reforms without analyzing the effects of these reforms on people with disabilities or the 
differences between welfare and disability programs, many people with disabilities would 
be hurt.  
 
Perhaps the most compelling reason for optimism is that progress in medical and assistive 
technologies continues to improve the ability of people with significant functional 
limitations to be productive. Over time, when accompanied by the economic self-
sufficiency approach we described, medical and technological innovations will encourage 
the labor market participation of would-be workers with many types of disabilities. By 
the same token, paternalistic programs will become more and more inefficient and 
inequitable, and those who must rely on them will be less and less able to enjoy the 
benefits of our nation’s prosperity.  
 
The issue is not whether we will move to an economic self-sufficiency policy but rather 
how and how fast we will move and how much progress we will achieve toward the goals 
of greater economic self-sufficiency and a higher standard of living for people with 
disabilities. Addressing this challenge will require a full and open debate.  
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Endnote  
 
1. Reported on the website of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/TWWIA/07 BuyIn.asp (accessed December 30, 2005).  
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